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1.   Introduction 
The purpose of this study is twofold: First, it provides an empirical characterization of 
fiscal  policy  in  Colombia  over  the  last  decades,  by  assessing  the  three  most  relevant 
macroeconomic  factors:  (i)  the  behavior  of  fiscal  policy  over  the  business  cycle;  (ii) 
whether it has been coherent with the long-term debt sustainability; (iii) whether it has been 
a significant source of macroeconomic volatility.  The results are compared internationally.  
Second, it evaluates the fiscal stance of the Colombian authorities during the 2008 global 
financial crisis, and examines the adoption of a fiscal rule as an appropriate tool to manage 
public finances beyond the recovery phase. 
 
To meet the first objective, a standard fiscal reaction function was estimated, and other 
customary empirical techniques (fiscal impulses and co-integration test) were applied. The 
analysis  led  to  the  conclusion  that  discretionary  fiscal  policy  in  Colombia  has  been 
historically pro-cyclical; that it has been closely consistent with the long-term condition of 
debt sustainability; and that its volatility has been decreasing in recent years.  Regarding the 
second  objective,  the  analysis  revealed  that  the  Colombian  fiscal  authorities  adopted  a 
rather neutral posture during the crisis --a discretionary counter-cyclical (or pro-cyclical) 
fiscal plan to compensate for the decline in real activity has not been developed mainly 
because of the lack of fiscal space.  
 
Two short and medium-term scenarios were considered to assess the fiscal effects of the 
crisis: one with a moderate impact and a quick economic recovery; and the other, with a 
slightly more severe impact and a slower growth recovery. As a result of the economic 
slowdown, the analysis shows that the government finances are likely to suffer a substantial 
decline: tax revenues will drop more than -4% in 2010 (in real terms); the primary balance 3 
 
will be negative between 2009 and 2011 (higher than -1% of GDP); and debt levels will 
reach those attained at the beginning of the decade (above of 40% of GDP), when the 
central government finances were highly fragile. 
 
Despite  this  short-term  fiscal  deterioration,  the  Colombian  fiscal  indicators  had  been 
improving  over  the  pre-crisis  period,  as  a  result  of  a  favorable  domestic  and  external 
macroeconomic environment as well as various fiscal reforms. Going beyond the recovery 
phase, the adoption of a fiscal rule on government accounts would be a suitable tool to help 
consolidate  the  public  finances  in  the  long  term.  Prospective  exercises  were  made  to 
support  the  benefits  of  this  tool.  Overall  this  discussion  is  organized  as  follows:  an 
empirical characterization of fiscal policy in Colombia over the last decades is provided in 
Section 2. The fiscal stance of the authorities during the 2008 global financial crisis is 
described in Section 3. An assessment of a fiscal rule to be applied to the long-term public 
finances is presented in section 4.  Some conclusions are drawn in section 5.  
 
2. Empirical characterization of the fiscal policy: the three major issues 
2. 1. The fiscal stance throughout the cycle  
 
A large number of empirical studies have found that the fiscal stance in industrial countries 
tends to be either a-cyclical or counter-cyclical, which is consistent with the stabilizing role 
of  fiscal  policy.
1  By  contrast,  other  studies  for  developing  countries  –low  and  middle-
income countries- or for emerging economies like Colombia, have usually concluded that 
their fiscal policies have a pro-cyclical character.
2 Among the reasons that explain pro-
cyclical  policies  are:  weak  fiscal  institutions,  borrowing  constraints,  and  the  so-called 
voracity  effect.
3  Gavin  et.  al.  (1996)  tested  some  of  these  factors  for  Latin  American 
                                                           
1 Gali (1994), Perotti (1999), Silgoner et. Al.(2003), Perotti (2004) 
2 Manesse (2006), Alesina and Tabellini (2005), Calderón, Duncan and Schmidt-Hebbel (2004), Kaminsky, 
Reinhart, and Végh (2004), Talvi and Végh, (2000); Gavin and Perotti (1997). 
3 According to Manasse (2006, Pg.7), the ―voracity‖ effect takes place…―in economies lacking strong legal 
and political institutions. In such circumstances, a windfall in revenue exacerbates the struggle for fiscal 
―Redistribution,  as  each  interest  group  tries  to  appropriate  its  share  without  fully  internalizing  the 
consequences of its own demand on general taxation. The lack of coordination, in this version of the familiar 
common pool problem, is ultimately responsible for a more-than-proportional increase in spending.‖ 4 
 
countries (LAC) in the nineties, reaching valuable conclusions.  In particular, they found 
out that the fragile relationship of Latin America with the international financial markets 
was  detrimental  to  the  adoption  of  counter-cyclical  policies.  This  occurs  since  these 
countries  often  face  a  loss  of  market  confidence,  during  economic  downturns,  that 
intensifies borrowing constraints.  
 
The Colombian fiscal policy through the cycle is explored empirically in this section, to 
validate  the  results  found  for  other  LAC.  First,  a  reduced  form  model  of  a  traditional 
reaction function is employed. The results are compared at an international level. Second, 
the fiscal impulses technique is applied which permits to do an annual evaluation of the 
fiscal stance. Assessing the causes of the fiscal posture during the cycles in Colombia is 
beyond the scope of this discussion.     
 
a. The fiscal reaction function 
 
The reduced form of the fiscal reaction function relates the fiscal balances in t (overall or 
primary),  Balt, in percent of GDP, to the lagged (or contemporaneous) output gap, Gapt-1, 
controlling  the  lagged  debt-GDP  ratio,  Debtt-1,  and  the  lagged  dependent  variable.  
Equation [1] shows this postulation:   
 
Balt =  α + βGAPt-1 +  Debtt-1 +  Balt-1 +  t         [1] 
 
where ε is an i.i.d. disturbance. In equation [1], β<0 is evidence of a pro-cyclical policy 
(β>0  countercyclical)  which  means  that  balance-to-GDP  ratio  falls  when  actual  output 
increases relatively to potential output. Regarding the relationship between debt and fiscal 
balance, which was first used by Bohn (1988) to test government solvency (sustainability), 
it is required that λ>0. We will return to this subject in the next section.  
 
Empirically,  the  endogenous  variable  of  equation  [1]  could  be  estimated  using  three 
possible alternatives: actual balance, Bal; cyclical-adjusted balance, Bal
CA; or using only 
the cyclical component of the balance, Bal
C, which is given by the difference between the 5 
 
first two concepts (i.e. Bal
C = Bal - Bal
CA). As it is shown below, in the first case, β reflects 
both the automatic stabilizer size and the endogenous change of the discretionary fiscal 
policy. In the second case, β gives the endogenous response of the fiscal policy to the cycle, 
precisely the indicator explored in this section.  In the third case, β reflects exclusively the 
size of the automatic stabilizers.
4 Regarding the fiscal balance definition, it must include 
the  interest  payments  on  the  public  debt  (overall  balance,  or  Bal)  or  exclude  these 
expenditures (primary balances, PrimBal). This second option is closer to the government 
budget constraints and reflects better the discretionary actions of the fiscal authorities.   
            
     Bal     β = automatic stabilizer + changes in endogenous policy 
Bal  =     Bal
CA   β = endogenous response of fiscal policy   
     Bal
C    β = automatic stabilizer   
 
Table 1 shows the estimation of the reaction function for Colombia employing annual data 
for the central government from 1960-2008. The outcomes are compared internationally 
with results derived from the Fatás and Mihov (2009) research.
5 Both for Colombia and for 
the OECD countries, the estimations were made through OLS (also with the instrumental 
variables  method  to  control  endogeneity  problem)  and  incorporate  dummy  variables  to 
capture  possible  changes  in  the  fiscal  regimes  (structural  breaks).
6  In  both  studies,  the 
cyclical adjusted balances are estimated using the OECD methodology.
 7  
 
The following two findings must be highlighted:  first, the long-term fiscal position of the 
Colombian government has been pro-cyclical (β <0). The different options of measuring 
the endogenous variable (Bal, Bal
CA, BalPrim, BalPrim
CA), are statistically significant and 
support this conclusion. Using the cyclically adjusted balance (β = -0.155), the parameter 
means  that for each percentage point increase in  the output gap, the structural  balance 
                                                           
4  Fatás A, and Mihov, I (2009) 
5  The Fatás and Mihov study was made, mainly, for the 12 major European Union economies (EU), USA, 
UK, and Japan for the period 1970-2005. 
6  In Colombia, the most significant dummy was detected in 1998, which coincides with a substantial increase 
in government spending rising from fiscal decentralization and social security programs implemented by the 
middle of the decade. In the European Union economies, the dummy applies since 1999, before the adoption 
of the single currency, and after the implementation the Stability and Growth Pact. 
7  For Colombia, see details in Lozano and Toro (2007). 6 
 
deteriorates by about one sixth-part. If we evaluate the reaction function with the cyclically 
adjusted primary balance (BalPrim
CA), as recommended by some authors, the degree of 




The second outcome refers to results at an international level. In particular, the European 
Union governments maintained, on average, a pro-cyclical stance between 1970 and 2007 
(β=-0.145), and only for the U.S., did the authors find evidence of a counter-cyclical stance 
(β = 0.133). For the Japan and the U.K cases, clear conclusions could not be drawn since 
the  parameters  were  not  statistically  significant.  Regarding  the  size  of  the  automatic 
stabilizer,  the  parameter  for  Colombia  is  notably  lower  (0.131)  than  that  of  developed 
countries, where it ranges from 0.26 (for Japan) to 0.46 (for European Union countries). 
 
b. The fiscal impulses  
 
A fiscal impulse is defined as a change in the cyclically-adjusted fiscal balance between 
two  periods,  and  can  be  assessed  both  with  the  overall  balance  (ΔOB
CA)  and  primary 
balance (ΔBP
CA). These indicators were compared with respect to output gap, in order to 
establish the fiscal stances through the business cycle. The advantage to use fiscal impulses 
rather than a reaction function is that a fiscal stance can be assessed annually. Figures 1 and 
2  show  the  results  for  a  shorter  period  (1994-2008).
9  The  slope  sign  of  the  trend  line 
captures  the  fiscal  posture  (on  average)  along  those  years.  The  negative  correlations 
between fiscal impulses and the output gap point out to the dominance of pro-cyclical fiscal 
postures in Colombia in recent times. A pro-cyclical fiscal policy was also evident in the 
economic expansion of recent years (2003-2007), in which the economy grew at an average 
rate of 5.8%.  Throughout the entire period considered, only four of the fifteen observations 
(years) displayed counter-cyclical fiscal stances.    
 
                                                           
8 Because of data limitations, it was not possible to calculate the reaction function for sub-period (before and 
after the break changes in 1998).  
9 Quadrants I and III reflect a counter-cyclical stance as the fiscal balance improved with positive changes in 
output gap, and quadrants II and IV reflect the opposite case (pro-cyclical stance). 7 
 
2. 2. Debt sustainability 
 
From a macroeconomic perspective, debt sustainability is the second important empirical 
fact that must be considered. According to equation [1], if λ is positive, the government 
tries to increase the fiscal balance in order to react to the existing stock of public debt and 
comply with the inter-temporal budget constraint (IBC). The standard interpretation of such 
a result could be seen as a sign of a Ricardian fiscal regime. However, the literature has 
emphasized that sustainability of public finances would require not only that λ be positive 
but also sufficiently positive.
10 The results for Colombia show that λ = 0.057 when the 
reaction function is evaluated with the actual primary balance, as dependent variable, and 
that λ = 0.045, when it is evaluated with the cyclically-adjusted primary balance (Table 1). 
The latter parameter has a higher significance level (95%). These results provide evidence 
that  the  Colombian  central  government  has  been  historically  coherent  with  the  IBC. 
Internationally, the clearest evidence of fiscal sustainability is offered by the U.S. and the 




A co integration analysis between the tax revenues (tt) and the primary expenditures (gt) of 
the  central  government  was  performed  as  an  alternative  technique  to  assess  fiscal 
sustainability, and as a means to complement the analysis of parameter λ from the fiscal 
reaction function; in particular, it was important to assess if the size of such parameter was 
positive  enough.  The  idea  behind  co  integration  analysis  is  that  if  we  assume  that  the 
discount rate (δ) of the IBC follows a stationary process, as it is empirically commonplace, 
we can expect  a long term relationship  between these two variables (Hakki  and Rush, 
1991).
11 If this is the case, we use the reduced-form model  , 
where  ´s  and    are  the  cointegration  parameters,  D  denotes  dummies  -capturing  the 
possible structural changes-, which are estimated endogenously using Gregory and Hansen 
(1996)  tests,  and  ε  is  the  error  term.  Because  of  data  availability  constraints,  this 
                                                           
10 Alfonso (2005).  See details in Afonso pg.14 and 24. 
11 The budget constraint could be expressed as   , where bt is the debt to GPP 
ratio, Et is the expectative operator, and the no-ponzi game condition is imposed.  8 
 
cointegration analysis was made for a shorter period with quarterly data (from 1990Q1 to 
2008Q4).  
 
Initially, both the unit root and the cointegration tests were checked as well as the long-term 
causality test between (tt) and (gt), through the Vector Error Correction Model, VECM. 
Two important findings emerged. First, variables were co integrated only considering a 
structural break in 2003Q1 (Table 2), which coincided with the adoption of some fiscal 
reforms  known  as  "second  generation-reforms",  implemented  to  adjust  government 
finances.
12 Second, there was evidence in favor of the expenditures-to-revenue-long-term 
determination-hypothesis, which means that the government spending has been determining 
the  dynamics  of  its  revenues  (Table  3).
13  On  the  basis  of  these  results,  the  fiscal 
sustainability  test  using  Dynamics  OLS  (DOLS)  and  the  sustainability  test  of  Quintos 
(1995) were performed. The reduced-form model employed can be expressed as 
 
            [2] 
 
 
where the forth term on the right side of [2] is used to control the short-term dynamic of the 
exogenous  variable.  Table  4  displays  the  results.  Because  the  parameter  β  (β=0,48)  is 
neither (statistically) close to one (which is the case of a strong sustainability condition) 
nor close to zero (unsustainability condition), we can conclude that the fiscal stance in 
Colombia, during the last two decades, has been sustainable but in a weak sense (0<β<1), 




2.3 Volatility  
 
The volatility of fiscal policy is the third empirical aspect to be examined. According to the 
reaction function, equation [1], any exogenous discretionary fiscal decision, which is not 
                                                           
12 The fiscal reforms are described in (Lozano, 2009). 
13 Table 3 shows that the error correction term (δ) is statistical significant only in the income equation.  
14 More details on these results are offered in Lozano and Cabrera (2009)  9 
 
related to the debt level or to the state of the economy (output gap), is captured by the error 
εt.  Consequently,  the  error  behavior  can  be  used  to  analyze  the  volatility  of  the 
discretionary fiscal policy, and therefore to get an idea of the role played by fiscal policy, 
from a macroeconomic volatility perspective. Table 5 shows errors volatility for Colombia 
since 1960. The results are compared with fiscal volatility figures found by Fatás et.al, 
(2009) for major OECD countries.  In both  cases,  the overall actual balance is  used as 
endogenous variable. 
 
Fiscal volatility, measured by the error´s standard deviation (SD), was 0.84 for the overall 
period. Looking at sub-periods, the nineties registered higher fluctuations of the residuals 
(SD =1.37) than those of the seventies and eighties (SD = 0.61). The highest volatility 
reached in the nineties was partially associated to the public spending commitments of the 
Political Constitution of 1991, which generated a large deficit and high-debt levels for the 
central government by the turn of the century. 
 
It is important to note that the highest fiscal volatility in Colombia, during the nineties, 
coincides with the highest level of economic growth volatility. However, this indicator has 
been  decreasing  in  recent  years,  facilitating  macroeconomic  stabilization.  Historically, 
fiscal policy in Colombia has been less volatile than in Japan and the U.K, but more volatile 
than in the U.S. and the G-20 countries of European Union. For the latter, volatility figures 
were substantially reduced after the adoption of the single currency in 1999. As was the 
case in Colombia, fiscal policy in the U.K. and the U.S. was less volatile after 1999. 
 
3.  The fiscal stance during the 2008 global financial crisis  
 
As  described  in  the  previous  section,  from  the  1960s  discretionary  fiscal  policy  in 
Colombia has been pro-cyclical; it has been consistent with the long-term condition of debt 
sustainability --although in a weak way, particularly over the last two decades; and it has 
registered decreasing volatility rates in recent years. Under this scenario, it is important to 
analyze how the 2008 global financial crisis affected public finances in Colombia, and 
whether its fiscal authorities are exploring new policy mechanisms conducive to long-term 10 
 
self confidence. These queries are tackled, first, by describing the fiscal indicator behavior 
during the pre-crisis period; and second, by reviewing the changes in its forecasting, once 
the slowdown in economic activity became evident. 
 
Regarding the first query, it is evident that in the course of last decade, Colombia's public 
finances have displayed a remarkable improvement. The fiscal balance of the consolidated 
public sector (CPS) shifted from a deficit of 4.9% of the GDP in 1999, to a small surplus of 
0.1% of the GDP in 2008.  In that period, the deficit of the Central Government (CG) went 
down from 6% to 2.3% of the GDP, and its debt level decreased from 47.5% of the GDP in 
2002 to 36%, in 2008. These results were fostered by fiscal reforms designed to increase 
revenues (three tax reforms) as well as to moderate the growth of public expenditures (two 
pension  reforms  and  two  reforms  to  transfer  resources  at  sub-national  levels,  among 
others).   However, the most important factors of such a successful fiscal performance were 




The sharp economic slowdown that began in the fourth quarter of 2008 and extended into 
2009 caused a significant  drop in  the tax revenues  of the  central  government,  and the 
subsequent deterioration of its fiscal position. The Colombian economy has accumulated 
negative growth rates for the last four quarters, from -1% (2008Q1) to -0.2% (2009Q3). 
The  external  transmission  channel  (fall  in  commodity  external  prices,  falling  exports, 
falling remittances, temporary restriction of credit markets, etc.), was the most important 
channel  of transmission of the  global crisis.  Despite the impact  of these factors in  tax 
revenues, fiscal authorities decided to keep the same expenditure levels to avoid a further 
contraction of the domestic demand, which could exacerbate the economic downturn.  
 
As a result, the deficit of the central government for 2009 rose from an initially expected 
level of 2.6% of the GDP to a final level of 4% (Figure 3). The changes in fiscal forecasting 
meant a deterioration of the balance of 1.4% of the GDP. It is anticipated that the fiscal 
                                                           
15 In 2004 for instance, the debt ratio was reduced in 4.5 points of the GDP, out of which 3.6 points were 
explained both by economic growth and by the appreciation of the COP. See details in Lozano (2009) 11 
 
balance will continue to deteriorate in 2010, by the lagged effect of the crisis. Because this 
larger  fiscal  deficit  is  mainly  explained  by  the  fall  of  endogenous  revenue  and  the 
preservation of public-expenditure rates, this fiscal stance can be typified as a-cyclical.      
 
At the bottom of Table 6, the size of the automatic stabilizer for 2009 is calculated, i.e, the 
impact of the fall in economic activity on the government's fiscal balance; these results are 
compared internationally. The economic growth forecast for 2009 was reduced from an 
initial rate of 5% to a final rate of 0.5%, while the fiscal imbalance increased from 2,6% to 
4% of the GDP correspondingly. Therefore, it can be concluded that for each percentage 
point of lower economic growth, the fiscal deficit deteriorated 0.3% of the GDP. The effect 
of the crisis for industrialized and emerging economies (G-20) would be, on average, very 
close to that found for Colombia.
16 
 
Short and medium term fiscal forecasting 
 
The deterioration of the Colombian fiscal indicators in the short and medium terms will 
depend on the severity of the economic downturn in 2009 and 2010, and particularly on the 
recovery path of subsequent years. As will be the case of other Latin American Countries 
(LAC),  economic  recovery  in  Colombia  will  be  conditional  to  the  revitalization  of  the 
global  economy  and,  in  particular,  of  the  U.S.  economy  and  those  of  other  important 
trading partners such as Venezuela, Ecuador and the E.U. Figure 4 displays two foreseeable 
scenarios for Colombia's economic growth for the period 2009 to 2011: Scenario 1 with a 
moderate impact of the international crisis and a quick economic recovery; and Scenario 2 
with a slightly more severe impact and a slower economic recovery.  
 
A comparison of the above-mentioned forecasting with the WEO-IMF growth-forecast for 
LAC leads to the conclusion that:  i) the moderate growth scenario is coherent with what 
IMF is expecting for Colombia, and ii) the growth impact of the crisis in 2009 was more 
severe in countries like Mexico, Chile, and Brazil, even though the growth recovery has 
                                                           
16 The effect of the automatic stabilizers on the fiscal balance is calculated using standard accounting 
techniques (see 1 in Table 6). For OECD and emerging economies, see IMF (2009). 12 
 
been faster in these countries. The Colombian economic performance in these two years 
(2009-2010), is just equal to the average (simple) for the region (Figure 5).  
 
Under each economic growth scenario and considering other consistent macroeconomic 
assumptions, a predicting exercise of tax revenue, primary balance and debt, for the short 
and medium terms, was carried out.
17 Figure 6 illustrates how the economic slowdown will 
have negative effects on the central government finances.  In both scenarios, government 
revenues will decline, in real terms, more than -4% in 2010; the primary balance will be 
negative between 2009 and 2011 (higher than -1% of GDP); and debt levels will reach 
those recorded at the beginning of the decade (above of 40% of GDP), when the central 
government finances were highly fragile. With regards to the pre-crisis period (2007-2008), 
the debt level could increase in 2011 about 8 percentage points of the GDP.  
 
Although the main fiscal indicators are declining in Colombia as result of the global crisis, 
it is certainly not a ―huge fiscal decline,‖ as has been the case of the majority of OECD 
economies. However, fiscal authorities are facing important policy challenges to guarantee 
the  long-term  sustainability  of  the  public  finances,  and  particularly  to  implement 
countercyclical tools that help face unexpected shocks like the 2008 crash. The defies are 
difficult and mounting since the Colombian government has been solving a larger demand 
for social expenditures, particularly in the social security services; the poverty level has 
increased in recent times (around of 45%); and the political internal conflict still remains to 
be solved.  
 
4. Designing a fiscal rule to manage public finances 
 
According  to  preliminary  exercises  of  prediction,  the  primary  balance  for  central 
government will return to an equilibrium level (not positive) only since 2014. This means 
                                                           
17  The  macroeconomic  assumptions  are  derived  from  the  balance  of  payments,  and  include  inflation, 
exchange rate, external prices of major commodities, the import growth, and the economic growth of major 
trading partners.  13 
 
that only by then, the debt to GDP ratio would return to its downward trend.
18 Under these 
circumstances, it is not advisable for the government to assume a passive fiscal posture in 
the upcoming years. The unexpected increase in fiscal deficits and public debt has raised 
concerns about the sustainability of public finances in Colombia, and underlines the need 
for additional adjustments in the medium term. 
 
As was mentioned in section 3, Colombia has made significant progress towards fiscal 
consolidation over the last ten years. Nevertheless, the fiscal adjustments have not sufficed 
and, somehow, they have been partially reversed by the 2008 global financial crisis.  The 
current  scenario  calls  for  the  adoption  of  a  fiscal  rule  (well-designed  and  well-
implemented) on central government finances that would guide fiscal policy in medium and 
long terms and, particularly, anchor expectations regarding the sustainability of the public 
debt.  The  fiscal  adjustments  advanced  to  date  constitute  a  credible  prelude  for  the 
establishment of such a rule.  
 
A  recent  IMF  study  states  that  in  countries  with  no  existing  rule  and  relatively  small 
adjustment  needs  (like  Colombia),  early  implementation  of  a  fiscal  rule  may  help 
strengthen policy credibility. The confidence and credibility are essential to anchor long-
term expectations about the sustainability of the public debt. Such anchoring, in turn, could 
help prevent adverse market reactions, including a higher risk premium, and facilitate the 
adoption of a prudent fiscal policy (IMF 2009). It should be recalled that Colombia does 
not have investment grade, like Chile, Brazil, Mexico, and Peru, which means that its debt 
is relatively more expensive. In this regard, the fiscal rule might help the country regain the 
investment grade that was lost in the late nineties.  
 
From  a  macroeconomic  standpoint,  there  is  evidence  that  fiscal  rules  enhance  the 
credibility of government decisions; allow countries to have countercyclical and sustainable 
fiscal policies; and contribute to economic stability and long-term economic growth.
19 The 
adoption of fiscal rules has become an institutional strategy for most OECD countries and 
                                                           
18 This is mainly due to the fact that output gap remains negative until 2013.  
19  Kopits (2004), and Fatás and Mihov (2003). 14 
 
for several LAC (Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Peru). Colombia began to introduce fiscal 
rules by the end of the nineties, but mainly at the sub-national level. In particular, the 
operational  expenditures  and  the  debt  levels  of  the  sub-national  governments  were 
constrained  to  the  performance  of  their  own-revenues  and  to  their  payment  capacity, 
respectively. Since then, local governments in Colombia have not been a source of fiscal 
disequilibrium.  
 
Among  several  alternatives,  the  Colombian  government  is  currently  analyzing  the 
cyclically-adjusted primary balance (CAPB) as one of the best indicators to fix the fiscal 
rule. The primary balance excludes the interest payments on the debt, over which the fiscal 
authority  has  no  discretion.  As  such  payments  could  be  very  sensitive  to  exogenous 
macroeconomic variables such as the exchange rate and the interest rates (domestic and 
external), may be appropriate that the rule  would not depend on the volatility of these 
variables. Another advantage of focus on CAPB is that is relatively more controllable by the fiscal 
authorities. In addition, if the rule is adopted to guide fiscal policy towards the smoothing 
the economic fluctuations, the international evidence suggests that the CAPB becomes in 
one the best indicators since it allows the automatic stabilizers to operate fully. 
  
Figure 7 displays a CAPB long-term prediction exercise, to examine the adoption of a fiscal 
rule on this indicator. For the reasons stated above, the coverage of the new rule would 
apply only to the central government finances. The fiscal forecasting exercise is made on 
the basis of a conservative macro-scenario, which does not contemplate any additional tax 
reforms, and is also consistent with the reduced fiscal space. Remarkably, the negative 
output  gap  will  close  smoothly  until  2013  (right  scale).  Moreover,  the  CAPB  will  be 
negative until 2013 (-0.6% of the potential GDP, on average) and, thereafter, will remain 
almost  in  equilibrium  for  the  following  two  years.  Afterward,  the  CAPB  will  become 
positive (on average 1.6% of the potential GDP between 2016 and 2020).  
 
In conformity to these results, the fiscal rule must have at least three key elements to secure 
credibility, counter-cyclicality, and fiscal discipline in the long term; moreover, it should be 
supplemented by other fiscal reforms to render feasible its implementation. First, the CAPB 15 
 
rule must include more than one numerical target for the coming years, to make possible its 
fulfillment  at  the  stage  of  economic  recovery.  Assuming  that  the  fiscal  rule  would  be 
adopted as of 2011, for instance, this paper proposes a numeral target in three steps: -0.5% 
of GDP for 2011, 2012 and 2013; +0.5% for 2014, and 2015; and finally, +1.5%, as of 
2016. These  goals  must be  reviewed  at  any  prudential  intervals  (i.e.  every 5  years) to 
introduce any required adjustments.  
 
Second, the numeral target on CAPB must guarantee a decreasing trend for the debt-to- 
GDP ratio of the central  government,  so  that in  the long term  (2020 and thereafter) it 
reaches  levels  close  to  (or  below  of)  30%  of  GDP.  Finally,  any  positive  or  negative 
divergence in output gap with respect to what is considered here, will allow the government 
to design a counter-cyclical fiscal policy, to absorb partially any external shocks, and to 
smooth the business cycle. For the case of unusual and unpredictable exogenous financial 
and real shocks, generated from external and domestic sources (terms of trade, sudden stops 
in capital inflows, natural catastrophes, wars, and so on), is recommended that the fiscal 
rule includes explicitly clauses of scope to these events. This study offers evidence for the 
first two elements in Figures 9 and 10.     
 
5.  Conclusions    
 
The following points summarize some of the most important findings of this study:   
o  From the 1960s, discretionary fiscal policy in Colombia has been pro-cyclical; it has 
been coherent with the long-term condition of debt sustainability  -although in a 
weak sense, particularly over the last two decades; and it has registered a decreasing 
volatility in recent years. These have been the three most relevant traits of fiscal 
policy, from a macroeconomic perspective.  
 
o  Pro-cyclicality was assessed both through a standard fiscal reaction function and 
through  fiscal  impulses.  The  results  show  that,  on  average,  for  each  percentage 
point increase in the output gap, the structural balance deteriorates by about one 
sixth-part. Fiscal sustainability was also evaluated through co-integration models. 16 
 
These  models  offer  evidence  in  favor  of  the  expenditures-to-revenue-long-term 
determination-hypothesis,  which  means  that  the  government  spending  has  been 
determining the dynamics of its revenues. Between 1990 and 2008, on average, an 
increase of 1% of the GDP in the primary spending was associated with an increase 
of 0.48% of the GDP in tax revenues.  In practical terms, this means that the fiscal 
stance was sustainable, but only in a weak sense. 
 
o  Throughout  the  pre-crisis  period,  public  finances  displayed  a  remarkable 
improvement  in  Colombia.    Between  2002  and  2008,  the  fiscal  balance  of  the 
central government went down from 5.3% to 2.3% of the GDP, and its debt level 
decreased from 47.5% to 36% of the GDP.  These positive trends were fostered by 
fiscal reforms designed to increase revenues as well as to moderate the growth of 
the  public  expenditures.  However,  their  most  important  causes  were  relative  to 
favorable internal and external macroeconomic factors, including the boom of oil 
prices. The sharp economic slowdown that began in the fourth quarter of 2008 and 
extended into 2009 (the last four quarters have yield negative growth rates) caused a 
significant  drop  in  tax  revenues  and  the  subsequent  deterioration  of  the  fiscal 
indicators. 
 
o  The deficit of the central government for 2009 rose from an initially expected level 
of 2.6% of the GDP to a final level of 4% (deterioration of 1.4%). It is anticipated 
that the fiscal balance will continue to decline in 2010, by the lagged effect of the 
crisis.  Because  this  larger  fiscal  deficit  is  mainly  explained  by  the  fall  of 
endogenous  revenue  and  the  preservation  of  public-expenditure  rates,  this 
discretionary fiscal stance can be typified as neutral or a-cyclical. It can be inferred 
that for each percentage point of lower economic growth, the fiscal deficit has been 
deteriorating by 0.3% of the GDP (i.e. 0.3 is the size of automatic stabilizer). 
 
o  An additional decline of the fiscal indicators in the medium term will depend on the 
severity  of  the  economic  downturn  during  2009  and  2010,  and  mainly  on  the 
recovery path of subsequent years. As will be the case of other LAC, economic 
recovery in Colombia will be conditional to the revitalization of the global economy 17 
 
and,  in  particular,  of  the  U.S.  economy,  and  those  of  other  important  trading 
partners such as Venezuela, Ecuador, and the E.U. Using two foreseeable scenarios 
for  economic  growth  in  Colombia,  for  the  period  2009  to  2011,  this  analysis 
concludes that:  the government revenues will decline, in real terms, more than -4% 
in 2010; the primary balance will be negative between 2009 and 2011 (higher than -
1% of GDP); and the debt levels will reach those of the beginning of the decade 
(above 40% of GDP).  Comparing to the pre-crisis period (2007-2008), in 2011, the 
debt level could increase by about 8 percentage points of the GDP. 
 
o  The unexpected increase of fiscal deficits and public debt, as a consequence of the 
global financial crisis, has raised concerns about the sustainability of public finances 
in Colombia. The short and medium term scenarios call for the adoption of a fiscal 
rule on central government finances that would guide fiscal policy in the future. The 
fiscal  adjustments  advanced  to  date  constitute  a  credible  prelude  for  the 
establishment of such a rule. 
 
o  The adoption of  a fiscal  rule may strengthen policy  credibility. Confidence  and 
credibility are essential to anchor long-term expectations about the sustainability of 
the public debt. This, in turn, could help prevent adverse market reactions, including 
a  higher  risk  premium,  and  facilitate  the  adoption  of  a  prudent  fiscal  policy.  It 
should be recalled that Colombia does not have an investment grade, like Chile, 
Brazil, Mexico, and Peru, and that the fiscal rule might help the country regain the 
investment grade that was lost in the late nineties. 
 
o  The Colombian government is currently analyzing the cyclically-adjusted primary 
balance (CAPB) as one of the best indicators to fix the fiscal rule. After a CAPB 
long-term prediction exercise, this analysis suggests that the fiscal rule must have at 
least  three  key  elements  to  secure  credibility,  counter-cyclicality,  and  fiscal 
discipline in the long term. First, the rule must include more than one numerical 
target for the coming years. Assuming that the rule would be adopted as of 2011, 
the numeral target must contain three levels: -0.5% of GDP for 2011, 2012, and 
2013;  +0.5%  for  2014,  and  2015;  and  +1.5%  as  of  2016.  These  goals  must  be 18 
 
reviewed at any prudential intervals (i.e. every 5 years) to introduce any required 
adjustments.  
 
o  Second, the targets on the CAPB must guarantee a decreasing trend for the debt-to-
GDP ratio of the central government, so that in the long term (2020 and thereafter), 
it  reaches  levels  below  of  30%  of  the  GDP.  Finally,  any  positive  or  negative 
divergence in output gap, with respect to what is considered here, will allow the 
government to design a counter-cyclical fiscal policy to absorb any external shocks, 
and  to  smooth  the  business  cycle.  This  study  offers  evidence  of  these 
considerations. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1 
Fiscal Reaction Function for Colombia
1/ 
 




Coefficient s.e. Coefficient e.e. Coefficient s.e.
Bal -0.122 (0.061)* 0.047 (0.027)* 0.782 (0.103)*** 0.82
Bal
CA  -0.155 (0.061)** 0.028 (0.026) 0.716 (0.103)*** 0.82
Bal
C 0.131 (0.009)*** - - - - 0.81
PrimBal -0.096 (0.053)* 0.057 (0.024)** 0.651 (0.099)*** 0.61
PrimBal
CA  -0.139 (0.052)*** 0.045 (0.023)* 0.576 (0.098)*** 0.63
PrimBal
C 0.131 (0.009)*** - - - - 0.81
Coefficient s.e. Coefficient e.e. Coefficient s.e.
Euro Area (G-12) -0.145 (0.061) 0.016 (0.006)*** 0.721 (0.076)** 0.82
Japan -0.042 (0.100) 0.005 (0.007) 0.904 (0.069)** 0.78
U.K. -0.196 (0.127) 0.017 (0.032) 0.837 (0.095)** 0.67
U.S. 0.133 (0.065)*** 0.028 (0.014) 0.770 (0.103)** 0.69
Coefficient s.e. Coefficient e.e. Coefficient s.e.
Euro Area (G-12) 0.464 (0.005)*** - - - - 1.00
Japan 0.267 (0.012)*** - - - - 0.95
U.K. 0.391 (0.021)*** - - - - 0.94
U.S. 0.293 (0.013)*** - - - - 0.95
Notes:     CA Cyclical Adjusted     C Cyclycal Commponent   
            *** Significance at 99% level      **Significance at 95% level  *Significance at 90% level
 Períod 1960 2008   
  From Fatas y Mihov (2009) Período 1975  2007
Dependent  Variable  Bal
C 
Automatic Stabiliz 
Zon GAP t Debtt-1  Dep. Var. Lagged.
R
2
Dependent  Variable  Bal
CA 
Zon GAP t Debtt-1  Dep. Var. Lagged.
R
2
 Dependent  
Variable







Table 2. Unit Root Test 
 
 
Table 3. Cointegration Test with Structural break (Gregory-Hansen Test) 
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Table 4. Revenue and Expenditures Nexus 





Table 5.  Cointegration Relationship through DOLS (Stock y Watson) 
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S.D Total Period S.D Total Period
0.839 0.021
SD by Sub-periods SD by Sub-periods
1961-70       0.648 1961-70       0.011
1971-80       0.610 1971-80       0.018
1981-90       0.610    1981-90       0.015   
1991-00       1.373 1991-00       0.029
2001-08       0.815 2001-08       0.021
COUNTRY  Before 1999 After 1999




Note:   
/1   From  Fatás and Mihov (2009)  Period 1960 - 2000










1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
2006 2007 2008
Jun-08 March  09 Sep-09 ∆ Forecasting
Central Government -3.4 -2.7 -2.3 -2.6 -3.7 -4.0 -1.4
Decentralized Agencies 2.4 1.9 2.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 0.1
Cuasi-fiscal Operations 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 -0.1
Overall Balance -0.7 -0.6 -0.1 -1.2 -2.4 -2.7 -1.4
Change in Balance  -- -- -- -- -1.2 -0.3 -1.4
a. Colombia
   Economic Growt (y) 6.9 7.5 2.5 5.0 1.0 0.5 -4.0
   Δ in Econoic Growth (∆y) 1.2 0.6 -5.0 -- -4.0 -0.5 -4.5
   Size of the State (G/Y)
/2  30.6 -- -- --
  Effect of A. S. on Fiscal Bal/1 -- -- -- -- -1.2 -0.2 -1.4
b. OECD Countries and Some Emergent Countries/2
U.S -- -- -- -- -- -- -1.5
Japan -- -- -- -- -- -- -1.4
U.K. -- -- -- -- -- -- -2.0
Spain -- -- -- -- -- -- -1.8
Brazil -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.5
Mexico -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.8
Argentina -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.8
 G-20 (OECD and Emergents) -- -- -- -1.2
Source:  Ministery of Finance,  IMF (2009) and calculus of the author
/1  The size of the Automatic Stabilizer (A.S.) is stimate through of [2]:
A.S ≈ (G/Y)*∆OUTPUT GAP [1]
Asumming that ∆yt ≈ ∆Brecha Yt, y  then:
EAt ≈ (Gt/Yt)*∆y [2]
/2  From Table 11, pg 51, IMF (2009)
Fiscal Balance in Colombia (% of GDP)
Forecasting 2009




CA) vs. Output GAP: 1994-2008  
 
Source: Calculus of the author (OB




CA) vs. Output GAP: 1994-2008   
 
Source: Calculus of the author (PB



































































Changes in fiscal balance forecasting for 2009 (Percentages of GDP) 
 
 




Figure 4. Scenarios of Short-Term Economic Growth 
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Scenc. 1: Moderate Impact Scen. 2: More severe impact27 
 
 
Figure 5. Economic Growth for LAC: 2009-2010 
  
Source: WEO-IMF   
Figure 6. Fiscal Effects of the Economic Slowdown  
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Figure 7. Medium and Long Term Forecasting of the Cyclical-Adjusted  
Primary Balance (CAPB) for Colombia 
 
Source: Calculus of the author 
 
Figure 8. Fiscal Rule on Cyclical-Adjusted Primary Balance (CAPB) 
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Figure 9. Debt Forecasting with Fiscal Rule on CAPB 
(Percentages of GDP) 
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